AN IMF Working Paper has concluded that corporate/income tax rates in different
countries influence the capital structures that the multinational banks select
for their operations.
Captioned ‘Taxation and Leverage in International Banking' the
Paper found that “taxes matter significantly, through both the traditional debt
bias channel and the international debt shifting that is due to the
international tax differentials. The latter channel is more robust and tends to
be quantitatively more important. Our results imply that taxation causes
significant international debt spillovers through multinational banks, which has
potentially important implications for tax policy.”
The paper, which was released on 30th November, analyzed the
dataset for 558 commercial bank subsidiaries of the 86 largest multinational
banks in the world over 1998–2011.
It has noted that in most countries, firms can deduct interest
expenses from their corporate tax base, but not equity returns. This causes a
tax advantage of debt finance, the so-called debt bias of taxation.
According to the Paper, the excessive leverage induced by
corporate taxation has regained policy interest in the wake of the financial
crisis. Indeed, while taxes are unlikely to have caused the crisis, the high
indebtedness might have made firms more vulnerable to the negative shock and
could well have deepened the crisis.
A multinational can choose the financial structure of its
subsidiaries in different countries partly on the basis of tax differences. In a
high-tax location, debt finance is attractive because the interest costs can be
deducted at a higher rate. In a low-tax location, equity finance is more
attractive since the returns will be taxed at a lower rate with the repatriated
dividends usually exempt for the parent.
The Paper concluded that a bank's leverage ratio depends on
corporate taxes in two ways: (i) the traditional form of debt bias, measured by
the local tax rate in the host country of the subsidiary; and (ii) international
debt shifting, measured by the international tax difference vis-a-vis other bank
subsidiaries in the same group.
While the tax effects are statistically significant and large,
the international debt shifting channel appears to be more robust and is often
larger in the regressions than the traditional debt bias. It implies that tax
policy induces significant international spillovers through its impact on
multinational bank behavior.
The policy implication of these findings is that international
spillovers may intensify the incentives for tax competition by governments,
which may lead to inefficient policies. It could strengthen the case for
international tax coordination.
The second implication is that countries may seek measures to
remedy international debt shifting?such as, by imposing thin capitalization
rules that restrict the deductibility of interest on intra-company loans. These
measures, however, generally do not apply to banks and raise the issue of
specific bank regulation or bank taxation.
As put by the Paper, “More fundamentally, countries may
consider eliminating debt bias altogether by neutralizing the tax treatment of
debt and equity, e.g., by introducing an allowance for corporate equity?as
Belgium, Italy, and Latvia have done. In principle, such an allowance could be
applied specifically to the banking sector alone. Finally, capital requirements
may play a role for the impact of taxation. The results in this study, for
instance, suggest that banks become less responsive to tax if their equity is
closer to the minimal capital requirement. The interaction of taxation and
regulation is thus important for developing appropriate
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